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- d: MEMORANDUM TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE FROM: Al . Pearson, Judicial Fellow 
RE: Habeas Corpus Statute of Limi~~n revision 
DATE: · March 30, 1988 
r ';> The brevity of the attached habeas corpus statute of 
~ C,q, limitation proposal, while it may surpris,e. :,:ou,, could actuall,:,: 
Jr~ legislative language required to put it into effect. Hera is a 
prove to be a strength. The concept is: straight forward as, i,~ th'e 
l_ ist of the most important questions that the proposal takE}s _ int:e J\ 1 [1'1 . - ' 
uv i,.i- account: 
0 1. Should the SL be general o~ appl:x only in capital 
cases? Should it apply to both st~te and federal 
prisoners? nY 
-,J/ -<; _ .JJ 2. How long should a prison. er hav_e before the SL would 
~ 
t;r ~ operate as a bar to habeas: qorpu_s relie_£? , 
'TJ'f 3. What event or events shou-ld trigger the SL?, Under 
• 
(v •~\!Ji\ what circumstances would the operation of the SL be 
£~ l-t\ tolled? 
• 
~ 
4. At what point should counsel be provided in order. ~OZ:-
the SL to become operational i}1 a part1:cular case?;- Th.;i.s_ 
raises the possibility or perhaps necessity of a doµ~le _ 
trigger? From the perspective Qf the federal system, 
this proposal won't work unless there is representation 
at the state habeas phase where Brady and inef~e9tive · 
assistance contentions_ can be added, to. issues whic;:h have 
been presented on direct appeal . 
5. What system of legal representation do we ~ant to 
propose? Would a state qualify_ for the SL if it pu~ into 
operat ion a comprehensive system of legal representation 
in habeas cases? How would the system be certified as 
adequate for purposes of triggering the SL? Woul.d - such a 
broad gauged approach to legal representation make. ·the 
benefits of finality in criminal cases too expensive to 
be an effective inducement? The alternative would be to 
make the SL apply on a case-by-case basis---allowing ~he, 
government to make the cost-benefit assessment 
selectively and to commit incrementally. 
The attached proposal is for a one yea~ SL that is 






rationale for gauging the proposal so narrowly is that the 
finality problem arises almost entirely from this class of 
prisoners and in this class of cases. The inducement of quicker 
finality is offered to the states in return for their development 
of a system of representation for capital defendants in state and 
federal post-conviction proceedings. The purpose is to provide 
the optimal combination of judicial efficiency and fundamental 
fairness. 
Is this a r easonable~ pro~? 
It is clear that inmates are being added to death row more 
rapidly t han executions are being carried out. The reason is the 
length of time necessary to complete state and federal 
post-conviction proceedings---a problem that is intensified by a 
capital felon's understandable desire for delay and the 
procedural doctrines like the exhaustion requirement that make 
such a strategy generally quite effective. As complex and time 
consuming as death penalty litigation has proven to be thus far, 
more difficult times lie ahead • 
A 1987 study reveals the outlines of what it describes as a 
corning ''crisis". As of June 15, 1987; there were 1940-inrnates on 
death row nationally. Of those 1940 capital cases, 1021 were 
pending on state direct appeal. Approximately 660 were either 
pending in state post-conviction proceedings or had been ruled 
upon. The study forecast that 304 death penalty cases would be in 
ayosition to move into the federal habeas corpus phase of 






default. It would permit a habeas petitioner to try to 
return, to state court as required by Rose v. Lundy, but 
the clock would continue to run as to that issue. You 
-- could call this the "one clock principle'' for all issues 
and contrast it with the way exhaustion works which is 
issue-by-issue. The only circumstances where multiple 
clocks would be possible are identified in subparagraphs 
(1),(2) and (3). They are essentially situations where 
exhaustion was not possible due to factors beyond the 
control of the petitioner and his attorney. 
Subsection (f)---This subsection contemplates qualifying 
on a state-by-state basis. You could do it on 
county-by-county or case-by-case basis. But the 
inevitable comparisons between the haves and have nots 
might be undesirable. We want to move on this problem on 
a broad basis and doing i t at the state level is really 
the best approach in my view. My instinct is that we 
need a clear step which establishes that a program 
qualifies and that a SL is in effect. What about cost 
allocation? I put the costs entirely on the state, but 
the state can make some telling points in response. For 
example, the federal government has created the need for 
counsel because it has made habeas corpus relief so 
freely available. Why should the states pay 100% of the 
counsel fees for a problem that they didn't create in 
its entirety? The federal government can say that the 
states want the death penalty and federal habeas is 
necessary to make sure it is applied in a fair manner. 
In that sense, the states have contributed to the 
problem. A c ost s haring ag.prn<:lch s e em_§....1:he most 
lausibl!L c.o]!lpromise_ given these_lines _of_ argument. 
- 5 -
, - ' 
'· ~---<, ' 
·· 1 • 1 •!'-. PROPOSED STATUTE OF LIMITATION PROVISION 
,,·""'·, 
\ ~ : .1 
(· . . ' 
•> 
(} /// ' 
?(fl\~ . Section 2244 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by 
✓ Ju addi at the end thereof the following new subsections: 
~ "'I)'- ~ .· 
\f 12JP 
pursuant to a judgment of a state court, a one year period of 
JV limitation shall apply to the filing of an application for a writ 
✓ ~ of habeas corpus under this chapter. This period of limitation 
~ )/.~ shall apply only if the state, under the standards and procedures 
l\.VJY,_t set forth in subsection (f), has a program that provides 
~;IX\,4,,mpetent and adequately compensated counsel for state prisoners 
If\\\\ tnder death sentence during all state and federal post-conviction 
• Jv \l\ iproceedings. 
• 
"(e) The one year period of limitation shall run from the 
time at which state remedies are exhausted or could have been 
exhausted. It shall run separately with respect to any issue or 
issues for which the exhaustion requirement has not been 
satisfied because: 
"(1) the state created an impediment to post-conviction 
, ' 
review in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 
States; 
"(2) the .federal right asserted has been newly 
recognized and could not have been asserted in any prior 
pqst-conviction proceeding; or 
- 1 -
l 







"(3) _. the factual basis of the claim or claims could not 
have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable 
diligence. 
"(f) A state may qualify for the one year period of 
limitation if it establishes a comprehensive program providing 
for representation of capital defendants in state and federal 
post-conviction proceedings. To qualify, the capital 
representation program must receive the approval of a majority of 
the active judges of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals - -
in which the State is situated. The Court of Appeals shall 
approve a program of capital representation if it provides 
adequate compensation and otherwise assures the availability of 









MEMORANDUM TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE ~ 
FROM: Al Pearson, Judicial Fellow 
RE: Refinement of Habeas Corpus 
staj;.ut-e - of~tation Proposa 
r:.---. /\- ,,.'i 
~ ... -. .., 
... ·, .. -
DATT----April 13, ~8 
~ t t..a.chea--1.s -~ redraft of the statute of limitation 
proposal. It incorporates your s uggestions and attempts to refine 
some featu res. 
µ,ff 
r -
1. Section (d) establishes two triggers for the SL. 
Subs ection (d) (1) makes the SL applicable if a capital 
habeas applicant in fact was represented during state 
post-conviction proceedings and for an aggregate period 
of a year thereafter. The premise is a case-by-case 
determination of the applicability of the SL provision. 
Upon the conclusion of state post-conviction 
p roceedings, a lack of representation would toll the SL 
but once counsel comes back into the case, the clock 
resumes running. A tacking principle governs. Thus, five 
months of representa tion by Jones and eight months by 
Smith would make an aggregate period of representation 
of more than a year. If no federal habeas petition had 
been filed during that time, the SL would operate as a 
bar as specified in Section (e). 
• 
• 
Subsection (d) (2) enables a state to trigger the SL 
across-the-board in its own death penalty cases. The 
~pro~ is the establishment in accordance with 
section (f) of a program of legal representation in 
state and federal post-conviction proceedings. As 
written, the across-the-board option probably does not 
contain sufficient incentives to make the idea 
attractive to the states. They can argue with some force 
that all the costs of representation should not be borne 
by them. Some combination of state and federal financing 
is likely to be~ he key. 
Section (e) attempts to define the point in time from 
which the SL would run. Two ~lternatives are suggested. 
The first uses the date at which "state remedies are 
exhausted." I borrowed the "exhaustion" standard from 
the SL provision of HR 133~. In my view it is highly 
ambiguous. The concept of exhaustion is never used to 
describe a single moment in the process of state 
review---whether on direct appeal or during habeas 
corpus proceedings. In fact, it refers to a seri~s of 
instances throughout state review where the state 
judiciary has given all the consideration that it 
intends to afford to a particular issue. Linked as it is 
to discrete issues and the factual allegations in 
support of them, exhaustion can and regularly does take 
place at many different times during state review. With 







these reasons, "exhaustion" seems to be a particularly 
inapt starting point for a SL. 
We could try to assign a meaning to the term 
"exhaustion" for the purposes of this section that 
differs from the usage under 28 USC$ 2254(b). But the 
potential for confusion hardly seems worth it. What we 
seek is a clearly defined terminal point in state 
judicial consideration of criminal cases---a point that 
objectively reflects the end of the state prisoner's 
efforts. Depending on the nature of the issues involved, 
it could occur after direct appeal or after state 
post-conviction proceedings. But once state review is 
concluded and the state prisoner shifts his attention to 
the federal courts, the premise of this proposal is that 
he is entitled to a year to filed his application for 
federal habeas relief. 
The alternative language I propose would have the SL 
run from the ''last dispositive order on the merits" 
issued by a state court. Unlike the exhaustion concept, 
this language describes a single, identifiable point in 
time from which to measure the operation of the SL bar. 
As I conceive of this approach, it would not apply to 
rulings denying motions for rehearing or motions for 
extraordinary reconsideration of prior dispositive 
rulings. In my view, this language (or something based 
on the same rationale but more aptly phrased) is the way 
to go. 
A further advantage of the alternative language is 
that while it makes the operation of the SL independent 
of the exhaustion requirement, the SL rule still serves 
as a powerful disincentive against the filing of mixed 
petitions. It deals with one of the most serious but 
unintended consequences of Rose v. Lundy in the death 
penalty context. If a state prisoner seeks federal 
relief and raises an unexhausted claim, the SL clock 
would continue to run from the date of the "last 
dispositive order on the merits" in state court. Nothing 
in this proposal would deny the state prisoner the right 
to rush back to state to cure his exhaustion problem. He 
would required to do so, however, within the time frame 
of the one year SL---a difficult, if not impossible, 
task in most instances. 
Is this unfair to a state prisoner under death 
sentence? Not in my view since he bears none of these 
consequences if he is unrepresented. On the other hand, 
if the state prisoner is represented in state 
post-conviction proceedings and afterwards as this 
proposal contemplates, the factual record built up in 
the state courts ought to be entirely adequate to 
sustain all legal theories appropriate in federal habeas 
proceedings. Under these assumptions, the presentation 
of unexhausted claims to a federal court is difficult to 
- 2 -
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excuse. This proposal exacts a price for such 
"afterthought" contentions, but it is one that seems 
fair in view of the representation in death penalty 
cases that this proposal seeks to encourage. Moreover, 
it would seem to be reasonable from the perspective of 
judicial administration. 
Section (e) recognizes that there are certain issues 
that a state prisoner might not fairly be expected to 
r aise with i n the context of the one year SL and it 
creates exceptions for each of them. The SL runs 
separately if any one of the exceptions is applicable; 
it runs from the time at which the disability is 
removed. The rationale behind these exceptions is 
self-evident. 
In e ractice (...howev~r, the newly discovered evidence 
exception will probably be the source of most last ditch 
l i tigati on efforts in capital cases. I see no way to 
avoid this. Bare allegations of this type are easy to 
make. Meritorious a l legations are, of course, quite 
u nusual. In principl e, however, if there is previously 
unknown and unavailable evidence suggestive of a state 
capital pri s oner's innocence, the federal courts should 
always remain open to consider it. This particular 
exception suggests the limit of the present proposal; it 
seeks to promote fairer and mo re efficient consideration 
of capital case s but it does not attempt to deal with 
t h e chaos frequently associated with last minute 
attempts to stay executions. 
Section (f) needs little elaboration beyond what I 
have said in previous memoranda. If a state wishes to 
qualify .for the SL across-the-board, the program ought 
to compensate counsel and have controls that assure 
competency. Once a program is approved by the Court of 
Appeals, there will not be any further need for 
case-by-c ase review of the competency of individual 
attorneys before the SL could be invoked in a given 
case . 
- 3 -
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· -:__ . , ( L/-!7-<2'g1 
• . PROPOSED HABEAS CORPUS STATUTE OF LIMITATION PROVISION 
• 
• 
section 2244 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by 
adding at the end thereof the following new subsections: 
"(d) In all capital cases involving a person in custody 
pursuant to a judgment of a state court, a one year period of 
limitation shall apply to the filing of an application for a writ 
of habeas corpus under this chapter. This period of limitation 
shall apply if either of the following conditions is satisfied: 
"(1) the state prisoner was represented by counsel 
during all state post-conviction proceedings and for an 
aggregate period of at least a year following the 
completion of such proceedings; 
"(2) the state, under the standards and procedures set 
forth in subsection (f), has a program that provides 
counsel for s tate prisoners under death sentence during 
all state and federal post-conviction proceedings and 
the state prisoner was in fact represented by counsel 
pursuant-to such a program . 
"(e) The one year period of limitation shall run from [the 
time at which state remedies are exhausted) [the date of the last_ 
dispositive order on the merits issued by a state court prior to 
the application for a writ of habeas corpus under this chapter). 
It shall operate as a bar to all issues actually litigated on 






i . . 
and to those issues that might have been raised at either stage 
of review. The one year period shall run separately with respect 
to any issue or issues for which the exhaustion requirement could 
not have been satisfied because: 
11 (1) the state created an impediment to post-conviction 
review in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 
United. States; 
11 (2) the federal right asserted has been newly 
recognized and could not have been asserted in any prior 
post-conv i ction proceeding; or 
11 (3) the factual basis of the claim or claims could not 
have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable 
diligence. 
"(f) A state may qualify for the one year period of 
limitation if it establishes a comprehensive program providing 
for representation of capital defendants in state and federal 
post-conviction proceedings. To qualify, the capital 
representation program must receive the approval of a majority of 
the active judges of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals 
in which the state is situated. The Court of Appeals shall 
approve a program of capital representation if it provides 
adequate compensation and otherwise assures the availability of 







Proposed Amendment to 
2a, use 2254 
(adding Subsections (g}, (h) and (i)) 
(g) Except as provided in subsection (i) below, the district 
court shall have no jurisdiction to entertain a petition under 
this section unless the petition is filed within one year from 
the date of the judgment of conviction in state court or, in the 
event of a timely direct appeal from such judgment, the date on 
which direct appellate review of the judgment is exhausted or 
becomes final. The terms *direct appeal* and •direct appellate 
review• shall include all proceedings on direct appeal as of 
right and any certiorari proceed ings under state or federal law 
permitting or providing for direct review of the_ judgment of 
conviction or the judgment of a lower appellate court reviewing 
the judgment of conviction on appeal, but such terms shall not 
include collateral post conviction remedies or proceedings under 
state law in the nature of habeas corpus, coram nobis or the 
like. 
(h) In the event a post conviction proceeding for collateral 
review under state law has not been instituted or is still 
pending in state court at the time a petition in the district 
court must be filed in order to be timely under subsection _(g) of 
this section, the district court ~ ay entertain the federal peti-
tion but shall stay any proceedings thereon until such time as 
(1) all state remedies by way of collateral review are exhausted 
with respect to the claims presented or-<:{2) the respondent in 
behalf of the state expressly waives exhaustion of such remedies 




(i) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (g) of .this 
section, if a claim as hereafter defined first arises after the 
time for the filing of a federal petition under subsection (g) 
has expired or after an earlier federal petition has been heard 
and denied or while a federal petition is still pending, the 
district court shall have jurisdiction to entertain a petition, 
successive petition or an amended petition, as the case may be, 
asserting that claim; providing that the provisions of subsection 
(b) of this section regarding abstention pending exhaustion of 
state remedies shall apply, and, providing further, that the 
petition or amended petition is filed within sixty days after the 
claim f i rst arises or within such lesser time as the district 
court may direct when a federal proceeding is already pending in 
the district court at the time such claim first arises. A •claim~ 
within the meaning of this subsection shall mean only: (1) a 
claim based upon a new constitutional principle established by an 
intervening decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, 
which is retroactively applicable, and which was not reasonably 
foreseeable at the time any earlier federal petition was filed or 
could have been filed; or (2) the discovery of a previously 
unknown state of facts, sufficient to support a claim of consti7 
tutional deprivation. Such a claim •arises• within the meaning 
of this subsection on the date of the publication of the appli-
cable Supreme Court decision, or on the date such state of facts 
was either discovered or could have been discovered through the 





UNITED STATES COURT OF APPF.ALS 
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
September 1 2 , l 9 8 8 
~~ --
MEMORANDUM 
TO: ChieC Judge Charles Clark 
FROM: 
______. 
Mark Maney ( ~ 4t.d/'-f,-( a.--,_"-~ "'f .¥-/z. ..&.,.u.J 
SOBJECf Federal Habeas Corpus Review o! State Criminal 
Convictions 
--·-------------------------------------------------------------
Every Federal habeas corpus attack on a state criminal 
conviction inherently delays the finality of those convictions. 
In addition, the hnbeas process can be purpo!ely utilized to 
cause such delay. In most habeas cases, however, there is little 
likelihood or intentional delay. An incarcerated habeas 
petitioner usually wants to be set free promptly. Delay causes 
its own punishment. Failure to raise all possible issues or to 
bring the petition at the earliest possible time, in these cases, 
is presumably due to Ignorance o! rights or unavoidable 
--
circumstances, not lack or diligence. 
Capital prisoners awaiting execution do not share these 
incentives for prompt review. Although they desire to be Cree o! 
the sentence, the fear of execution overrides all else. Capital 
prisoners have a strong incentive to pursue all possibilities or 
• delay. 




• habeas corpus review, pnrticularly in capital cases, and possible 
methods or speedin~ the process. It beilns In Part I by 
discussing the major limits on federal habeas corpus -- abuse or 
the writ by delay and successive petitions, exhaustion, and the 
limits imposed by entorcing state procedural default rules. In 
Part It, the extent to which federal habeas corpus can be !urther 
limited without transgressini the Constitution is analy~ed. Part 
III lists potential statutory solutions to the perceived causes 
or delay -- delay in filing, successive petitions, exhaustion, 
and delay In resetting an execution date after a stay of 










J. Present Limits on Federal Habeas Corpus Review or State 
Crimlnal Convictions 
A. Di s mi s s a 1 ! or Abu s e o C the Wr i t - -~ i n F i l i n g the 
Petition 
-- , 
Rule ~(a)) or the Habeas Corpus Rules provides: 
\___✓ -
A petition may be dismissed it it appears that the 
state or whlch the res~ondent is an otficer has been 
prejudiced in its ability to respond to the petition 
by delay in its filing unless the petitioner shows 
that it is based on grounds of which he could not have 
had knowledge by the exercise of reasonable diligence 
before the circumstances prejudicial to the state 
occurred • 
This rule, adopted in 1977, introduced the equitable 
doctrine of laches into federal habeas review for the first 
time. C. Wriiht, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & 
Procedure S 4268.2, at 497-98 (1988) (Federal Practice & 
Procedure). Mere delay is not a bar; the state must establish 
that the delay has prejudiced its ability to ~espo~d to the 
constitutional claim asserted in the petition. Prejudice to the 
state's ability to retry the petitioner successfully is not 
relevant. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986). Delay should 
be "~isregarded where (1) there has been a change or law or !act 
(new evidence) or (2) where the court, in the interest of 
justice, feels that the collateral attack should be entertained 
and the prisoner makes a proper showing as to why he has not 
asserted a particular ground !or relief." Advisory Corrrnittee 
Note to Rule 9(a). 
12-.-lc_ qc~) 
B. Abuse or the Writ -- Successive Federal Petitions. 
...___ 
I! a defendant has previously petitioned for federal habeas 
~-
• corpus relief, a federal court is not required to entertain a subsequent application !or the writ ~ a-,/~ ?-,~ 
• • • lf the judge finds that ~ i--t raft's to 
allege new or different irounds for relief 
and the prior determination was on the merits 
o r , i ! new and d l f t e r en t g rounds a r e a l I e g e d , 
the Judge finds that the failure or the 
petitioner to assert those grounds In a prior 
petition constituted an abuse of the writ • 
Rule 9(b) of the Habeas Corpus Rules. See also 28 u.s.c. 5 --
2244(b); Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1983). 
At least w~ the petitioner is re resented by counsel, this 
rule has been interpreted to pr eclude a subsequent petition as to 
any constitutional claim that ttcould have been raised earlier.tt 
- - -- ---.. 
(
Straight v. Wainwright, 106 S.Ct. 2004, 2005 (1986)~ ell,~ , 
. y.M j o i n e d by Bu r g e r , C. J • , Rehn q u i s t , and O ' Connor , J J • , con cu r r i n g 
~ in the denial or stay). ~ also W~hlns, 464 U.S. ( •lL 
• 
( 377, 378-80 (1984) ~ joined by Bureer, C,J., Blackmon, j~ 
Rehnquist, and O'Connor, JJ., concurring); Jones v. Estelle, 722 
F.2d 159, 165-67 (5th Cir. 1983) (en bane). Greater tolerance 
for omitted claims must be shown prose petitioners. Jones, 722 
F.2d at 163 n.3, 165, 167. The standard for prose petitioners 
has not been established. Id. 
~
c. Exhaustion of/\ State Remedies. 
By statute, federal habeas corpus relief is not available to 
a state prisoner unless the prisoner has exhausted any remedies 
available in the state courts as to each constitutional claim 
presented. 22 U.S.C. S 22S4(b),(c). If a claim ls based on new 
e ~ fact , ~ ~~ e~ r y , there l s no ex h~ t ion, and a - -








l,,/\- 4...- CaM.A--( 
This limit on federal Practice & Procedure 55 4264.4. 
review is also a cause of delay. 
The exhaustion requirement is premised upon notions of 
P1~. -
comity; it Is not jurisdictional. Granberry v. Greer, 107 s.ct. 91-- 0-
M»r ~~ 
1671, 1673-75 (1987). Whan the state decides not to raise 
~~ 
exhaustion as a defense, the "court should determine whether the _ 
interests of comity and federalism would be better served by 
addressing the merits forthwith or by requiring a series of 
additional state and district court proceedings before reviewing 
the merits of the petitioner's claim." JQ. at 1675. Waiver is, 
therefore, not automatic, but likely if the state does not wish 
to raise exhaustion. See also Federal Practice & Procedure S 
4269.7; Resendez v. McKaskle, 722 F,2d 227, 229-30 (5th Cir. 
1984). 
Incident to the exhaustion doctrine is that in most cases a 
state court will have already heard and decided the prisoner's 
constitutional claims. Federal statute requires that the factual 
findings of the state court be given preclusive effect unless the 
petitioner establishes --
(1) that the merits of the factual dispute were 
not resolved in the State eourt hearing; 
(2) that the factflnding procedure employed by 
the State court was not adequate to afford a 
full and fair hearing; 
(3) that the material facts were not adequately 
developed at the State court hearing; 
(4} that the State court lacked jurisdiction of 
the subject matter or over the person of the 
applicant In the State court proceeding; 
(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the 








constitutional right, failed to appoint 
counsel to represent him In the State court 
proceeding; 
that the applicant did not receive a full, 
falr, and adequate hearing In the State court 
proceeding; or 
that the applicant was otherwise denied due 
process of law in the State court proceeding; 
or unless that part of the record or the 
State court proceeding in which the 
determination of such factual issue was made, 
pertinent to a determination ot the 
sufficiency ot the evidence to support such 
factual determination, is produced as 
provided for hereinafter, and the Federal 
court on a consideration or such part of the 
record as a whole concludes that such factual 
determination ts not fairly supported by the 
record •••• 
28 U.S.C. S 2254(d). _m also Townsend v. Swain, 372 U.S. 293, 
314-16 (1963) • 
This rule is complicated when mixed questions of law and 
fact are presented to the court. The Supreme Court has noted: 
"In the 5 2254(d) context. as ~lsewhere, the appropriate 
methodology for distinguishing questions or tact from questions 
of law has been, to say the least, elusive." Miller v. Penton, 
474 U.S. 104, 113 (1985). Preclusive effect should be given to 
the underlying factual findings, but the federal court remains 
free to decide the ultimate legal question. ~ Sumner v. Mata, 
455 U.S. 591, 597 (1982). 
{ 
D. State Procedural Def au I ts (~~7~/- V - ~ '1 ~'" 
I~.,_~,,.~ 
S tat e pr o c e du r a 1 r u le s , par t i cu la r 'l y con t emp or an e ifo s ft-v ~ 
~~ 
objection rules, also limit federal habeas corpus relief. -j 





noncompliance with forfeiture also bars federal habeas relief, 
unless the defendant can show cause tor the failure and actual 
prejudice resulting from the waiver of the constitutional 
claim. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86-88 (1977). See~ 
Smith v. Murray, 106 s.ct. 2661, 2668 (1986) (holding that ( 
Wainwright applies in death penalty cases). Although the 
Wainwright rule does not require that prisoners bring their 
federal petitions within a particular time limit, it reinforces 
state procedural rules and thus permits the states "to channel, 
to the extent possible, the resolution ot various types of 
questions to the stage of the judicial process at which they can 
be resolved most fairly and effici~ntly." Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 
1, 10 (1984). As such, to the extent a state requires that 
fed e ral constitutional Issues be raised on direct appeal, 
Wainwright greatly simplifies federal review. As to those 
matters properly raised in the state court, the federal court 
benefits from the prompt review and determination by the state 
court, and as to matters not properly raised, federal review 
consists only of determining whether cause and prejudice has been 
established. 
The ("ca~d prejudice" e,tceptio. to the Wainwright rule 
~ " ,, .. 
is narrow. The petitioner must show cause and prejudice in th~ 
- · 1-t,~,J 
conj u n c t i v e • " [ CJ au s e. for a pro c e du r a 1 de tau l t ( .~ d i n l r i 1 y 
requires a showing ot some external impediment preventing counsel 
from constructing or raising the claim." Murray v. Carrier, 106 
' 
s.ct. 2639, 2648 (1986). The Supreme Court has found cause when 
the defendant's "constitutional claim is so novel that Its legal 
.. 7 -
basis is not reasonably available to counsel •••• n Reed, 46 8 
• U.S. at 16. Novelty, however, is narrow. "Where the basis of a 
constitutional claim is available, and other defense counsel have 
perceived and litigated that claim, the demands of comity and 
finality counsel &ialnst labelini alleged unawareness of the 
objection as cause for procedural default." Eniie v. Isaac, 456 
U.S. 107, 134 (1982). The tact that current state law clearly 
rejects a "novel" constitutional claim is not cause for failing 
to object if the basis for the claim exists in federal law. Id. 
at 130. "Even a state court that has previously rejected a 
constitutional argument may decide, upon reflection, that the 
contention is valid." Id. 
It follows from the above discussion that "the mere fact ~ 
• that counsel failed to recognize the factual or legal basis for a~ claim, or failed to raise the claim despite recognizing it, does~ 
not constitute cause for a procedural default." Murray, 106 ,::;;.,,,, ~ 
1...--1., /'),,f,.,I + 
S.Ct. at 2648. It also follows that "[a] ttorney error short of ,>~ 
,, 
ine!fectlve assistance of counsel does not constitute cause for a~ 
procedural default." ~ at 2648. See also Smith v. Murray, 106 
s.ct. 2661, 2666-68 (1986). In addition, the claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel must first be presented to the 
state courts, as required by the exhaustion doctrine, or it 
cannot be used to establish cause. Mu r r a y , 1 0 6 S • Ct. a t 2 6 4 6 • 
To establish prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate "in 
the total context of the event at trial," that the constitutional 
errors "worked to his actual and substantial disadvantag~, 





dimensions." United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169-170 
(1982). (Although Frady involved review of a federal conviction, 
it explicitly held that the cause and prejudice standard is the 
same for state and federal prisoners • ..!.5!.:.. at 165.) ~/1 i:..J 
f'tA_ hJ ~/-J- v ~ ~ A / ~~ -
The potential severity of- t.h-i-s rule if ameliorated by the 
-4 
Supreme Court's admonition that "In an extraordinary case, where 
a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the 
conviction of one who ts actually innocent, a federal habeas -·-----------court may grant the writ even In the absence of a showing of 
cause for the procedural default." Murray, 106 S.Ct. at 2850. 
~ also Engle, 456 U.S. at 135. 
II. The Extent to which Federal Habeas Relief can be Further 
Narrowed. 
The present limits on federal habeas review of state 
criminal convictions are of relatively recent vintage. In 1977, 
both Rule 9(a) and Wainw~ight v. Syk~s began a substantial shift 
from earlier precedent. Prior to that time, forfeiture of a 
federal constitutional claim occurred only If the failure to 
comply with a state procedural rule was deliberate. Fay v. Noia, 
372 U.S. 391 (1963). Laches was also unknown. Federal Practice 
& rrocedure S 4288.2, at 497-98. It was not until 1981 that 
section 2254(a), which requires that a state court's factual 
findings be given preclusive effect, gained attention. See id . 
at S 4265.1, at 408. Dismissals for abuse of the writ under Rule 
9(b) because of successive petitions have also become more 
frequent. ~ Straight, 106 s.Ct. at 2005. 
It ls unlikely that the effect of these recent limitations 
has been completely felt or analyzed, but predictions can be 
'f, 
made. The expansion o! the Walnwrlghl doctrine will likely 
• encourage states to expand procedural rules requiring that 
federal constitutional claims be raised at trial or on direct 
appeal. For ·example, in Green v. Estelle, 706 F.2d 148 (5th 
Cir.), rehearing denied, 712 F.2d 995 {1983), the Texas Attorney 
General argued that Texas did not Impose a procedural bar for 
failure to objoct to a psychiatrist's testimony because of a 
misinterpretation ot the Constitution and not a procedural 
decision; the Fifth Circuit did not apply Wainwright. Texas may 
have altered its procedural position because or this decision. 
See Green, 712 F.2d at 997 (on denial or rehearing). The 
frequency with which petitions are dismissed as successive should 
force prisoners to raise all claims in their first petition. 
These rules should mean that a district court is presented with 
• one petition that raises constitutional claims previously raised 
on direct appeal. 
• 
None of the present limits are without exception, however.~ 
Each has an equitable exception that allows the petitioner to p_r~ 
See discussion in Part I. ~~ 
-.lt>w~ 
Therefore, despl te the 11ml ts, last-minute petitions cannot bev, S!J..k½-
---------------e ~pl al n the apparent error. 
!umnarlly rejected. ~ 
These ei~}tabl~ exce£tlon~ are pr~bably or constltutronal 
dimension. Sunmary dismissal may constitute a suspension of the 
--------------writ in violati~n of Art. I, Sec. 9, cl. 2. The Sixth Circuit, 
relying on its Interpretation or Supreme Court precedent, stated, 
"a rule which would permit a court to dismiss an action for 
habeas relief without any consideration of the equities presented 
.9 t ~ ~c'- s/L ~.~{AA-~~~~ 
~~~ --10-
• renders the habeas corpus process inadequate to test the legality of a prisoner's conviction and, thereby, constitutes a prohibited 
·suspension or the writ." Davis v. Adult Parole Authority, 610 
F.2d 410, 414, 414 n.10 (6th Cir. 1979). See also case cited id~ 
at 414 n.10; Atmore v. State, 1988 WL 69319 (Ala. Ct. Crim. App. 
May 24, 1988). Under this analysis, a statute or limitation for 
habeas petitions would require an equitable exception for 
constitutional claims that "could not have been raised earlier" 
because the claim is based on new fact or law. 
Arguably, a strict statute or limitation could be imposed on 
petitions for state criminal convictions. See Swain v. Pressley, 
430 U.S. 372, 384-86 (1977) (Burger, C.J., joined by Bla.ckmun and 
Rehnquist, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in the 
~ 
• Judgment). The writ originally issued to test only detention by· 
the United States, and not by the states. It was not until 1867 
that the writ was extended to allow review of detentions by the 
states. Act of Feb. 5, 1867. Initially, after being extended to 
• 
state detention, the writ was limited to review of jurisdictional o/"'- -
defects. The writ began its expansion in 1927 with Moore v. 
Dempsey, 261 U.S 86 (1923). ~ generally Federal Practice & 
Procedure S 4261. The origins of habeas review of state 





however, would still argue for some exception to any limit upon 
~a;;;;;: corpus review, so that a prisoner could raise newly 
discovered evidence or a change in the law that entitled the !Jw~ 
/91,7 ~ 
~~f-prisoner to release. 
/J . .II. k.~ 
• 
• 
Moreover, the principle has developed that 
the writ of habeas corpus should be left 
sufficiently elastic so that a court may, in. 
the exercise of its proper Jurisdiction, deal 
effectively with any and all forms or illegal 
restraint. The rigidity which ls appropriate 
to ordinary jurisdictional doctrines has not 






Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 268, 284. (1947). 
~
Substitution of a remedy for the writ of 
~ k 
habeas corpus, ~~ 
which is both adequate and effective to test the legality or a 
person's detention, is not a suspension of the writ. Swain, 430 
U.S. at 382. In Swain, a statute that prohibited federal 
district courts from entertaining habeas corpus petitions filed 
by prisoners incarcerated pursuant to a sentence imposed by a 
court of the District ot Columbia was found constitutional. The 
Court relied on a provision in the statute that permitted review 
by the federal district courts if it appeared that the remedy 
afforded was "inadequate or ineffective" to test the legality or 
the petitioner's detention. Id. at 381. This opinion implies ! 
that such a safeguard would b-:-reguired In any substitued remedy. 
III. Possible Changes in the Procedure !or Federal Review of 
State Criminal Convictions. 
Of the four suggested causes for delay~elay in filing, 
/ ,r, . t i t . Cf) h ' ( 1/--r:J 1 . t t . <..__7success1ve pe ions, ex aust1on, an~e ay 1n rese 1ng 
execution dates--only two appear to warrant change in federal 
/~r habeas procedure. Successive petitions are already addressed by 
~ Rule 9(b), and the effect or exhaustion is mitigated by the 
~ l!!'J state's ability to waive this requirement. Therefore, only delay 7 
~ ~filing and setting execution dates are addressed below. 






Delay in filing habeas petitions threatens the finality of 
the criminal process. There is no penalty imposed for pure delay 
in filing a habeas petition, absent prejudice to the state. 
Although Wainwright and Rule 9(b) encourage prisoners to raise 
their constitutional claims in a sinile state proceeding followed 
by a single federal habeas review, a death-row inmate still 
great Incentive to file a habeas petition just prior to an 
execution date. 
has~ 
It is a virtual certainty that a state capital prisoner will 
file at least one !ederal habeas petition. Getting the prisoner 
into federal court at the earliest possible time, therefore, is 
the most effective way or speeding finality of criminal 
convictions. Three methods or achieving that end follow. 
f - -·"-- -------·-
1. Statute or Limitations . -
Two variations of a statute of limitations have been 
r 
outlined by A_!_!_~rson and Judge Hodges. This approach appears ~ 
to present several problems. Its constitutionality, discussed o--i,- < 
above, ls not clear. The time the limitation period should start st/lt 
ls difficult to ascertain. If time is to run from the end or 
direct review of the conviction,...,..trxhaustion is threatened. If it 
is to run from completion of collateral review, that date ls 
virtually impossible to determine. 
2. Modified Statute or Limitations 
Wainwright and Its progeny make a modified statute of 
~ --------------
1 imitations p~ssl,ble. Wainwright encourages states to require - ~ ~ 
that most, if not all, federal constitutional claims be raised by 
direct review. A statute of limitations applicable only to 
/ 3 
• federal constitutional claims raised in state court reduces the problems of a broader limitation. Such a limitation would leave 
!ew, i! any, constitutional claims for later review, but would 
not Infringe upon the exhaustion doctrine. The time period could 
be relatively short, running from the end of direct review-,....-and 
the record from the state appeal could be used by the district 
judge. 
The Infringement on habeas review would be minimal because 
the limitation applies only to claims known and previously 
raised. An equitable exception to the limitation period would 
further decrease the potenti~l unfairness of the rule. The 
"cause and prejudice" standard could be borrowed from Wainwright, 
so that a single standard would apply to any claim required by 
• the state to be raised on direct appeal that is not raised within 
the limitation period. 
• 
This modified limitation scheme suggests a third approach. 
3. Direct Review 
A process ot direct review of federal constitutional claims 
raised in state court is another possible method of hearing a 
defendant's constitutional claims. This approach has the same 
effect as a limitation period for habeas review because it can 
create a definite time-table for federal review. However, it 
would suffer fewer constitutional problems. It does not limit 
the power of federal hebeas corpus to override determinations of 
a person's federal constitutional claim. 
Direct review, however, may bother federalism. The Supreme 







The provision for 
>Ac; 
i 
highest state court by an 
direct review of the decision ot the 
inferior federal court is 
unprecedented. This concern is addressed by the following two 
approaches. 
a. State Option {_ ~~,) 
The state could be permitted to certify federal 
constitutional questions to a federal court of appeals. The 
state could be allowed to exercise this option by rule in all 
capital cases or by certification in individual cases !rom its 
highest court. 
b. New Intermediate Court with Review by the Supreme 
Court. J1A:> 
Under this approach a new court would be created to review 
direct criminal appeals in state capital cases. Opinions of this 
court would be subject to review by the Supreme Court. The 
precedential value or adopted opinions would need to be 
addressed. 
B. The Last-Minute Petition -- The Delay in ~setv_ng the 
Execution Date After the Execution has been Stayed. 
---=-----------
The equitable exception that exists with any limit on habeas 
corpus relief means that a state prisoner will always be entitled 
to bring a petition, at least to secure a determination that an 
earlier petition could not have been filed. There must be a -
method for _ a ~ --~o~~o~!~~cts _,or ~~hange { ~ 
in the law that entitles the prisoner to release. - ---~ This equity ~ ,~ \\ 
means there can be no absolute bar to last-minute petitions 
designed solely for delay. If a capital defendant files such a 





state rules a stay requires that a new execution date be set 
through a reworking or the entire date-setting process (often 30 
- 90 days minimum). The capital defendant thus may have an 
incentive to file even a frivolous petition. 
This l~ entive c~n be removed or reduced ~fa stay delays 
the execution date only to the extent necessary to review the 
habeas petition. This could be done by a simple provision that 
automatically resets the execution date following federal habeas 
action. A change in state procedure, however, would be required 
to implement this change • 
